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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-4056 
 ___________ 
 
 RAJESH ADHIKARI, 
                 Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
               Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A087-567-743) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 10, 2013 
 Before:  FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 11, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Rajesh Adhikari, a citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) decision denying his applications for relief from removal.  We will deny 
2 
 
his petition for review.1
 We agree with the BIA that Adhikari failed to demonstrate “a requisite nexus” 
between his claim and a statutory ground for asylum and withholding-of-removal relief.  
See Administrative Record (A.R.) 3 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  Under the REAL ID Act, which applies to Adhikari’s case, “the 
applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting” him.  
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 142 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Adhikari claimed, but did not show, that he was targeted for robbery and 
extortion based on his membership in a particular social group and his political opinion. 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that Adhikari articulated a cognizable social group of 
“substantial businessmen of means” under the statute, see Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 
527 F.3d 330, 345 n.10 (3d Cir. 2008), the record does not compel the conclusion that he 
suffered mistreatment because of his membership in that group.  Furthermore, although 
Adhikari explained that his assailants identified themselves as members of the Young 
Communist League and demanded money “from [his] business in order to develop” their 
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), reviewing the BIA’s disposition, as well 
as the Immigration Judge’s decision to the extent the BIA deferred to it.  See Roye v. 
Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012).  Agency determinations of fact are upheld 
“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary” 
based on the evidentiary record.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); accord Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 
665 F.3d 496, 498 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).  Because we write primarily for the parties, we will 
describe the facts only as they directly relate to our decision. 
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political organization, see A.R. 102–03, the assailants gave no indication that they were 
singling him out on any protected basis, whether social or political.  Cf. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (“The ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘persecution on 
account of . . . political opinion’ in [8 U.S.C. § 1101](a)(42) is persecution on account of 
the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.”).  Criminal activity and civil strife, 
while unfortunate, do not always implicate a protected ground under the Act.2  See, e.g., 
Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004).  In short, the BIA did not err 
in denying Adhikari’s asylum and withholding claims.3
 Adhikari also contends that the BIA applied the wrong standard in deciding his 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim.  We do not detect any infirmity in the BIA’s 
CAT analysis; simply put, the record does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely 
than not that Adhikari will be tortured if returned to Nepal.  See Roye, 693 F.3d at 341.  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
2 Although Adhikari contends that evidence in the record supports his claims, “[w]here 
the record supports plausible but conflicting inferences in an immigration case, the 
[agency’s] choice between those inferences is, a fortiori, supported by substantial 
evidence.”  Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 2007).   
 
3 We do not think that the BIA held Adhikari “to an overly strict standard.”  Pet’r Br. 25.  
Extortion that is, in part, politically motivated or is designed to enrich a political entity 
does not, under the reasoning of Elias-Zacarias, suffice to show that the targets of the 
extortion were selected on political or social-group grounds.  See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S 
at 482. 
